Crypto Wallet Threat Model, Honestly
Most wallet-security pages only describe what a design protects against. A genuine threat model describes both sides, and admitting the limits is what makes the rest of the claim credible.
What BMIC's design protects: the mathematics guarding your private key, against both classical attacks (the kind any computer today could attempt) and the specific known quantum attack method, Shor's algorithm, that threatens the elliptic-curve cryptography most other wallets rely on alone.
What it does not protect against, explicitly: if you type your seed phrase into a phishing site, no cryptography anywhere stops that, because you handed the key over yourself -- the math was never the weak point in that scenario. If malware already has control of the device you're viewing your wallet on, it can potentially see whatever you see on screen, regardless of what protects the key underneath. And no wallet -- BMIC included -- can honestly promise protection against an attack method that has not been discovered yet; that is a property of cryptography in general, not a limitation specific to this product.
A threat model is only useful if it is specific about both halves. Knowing exactly which risks a design addresses, and which ones remain squarely the user's own responsibility, is what lets you actually use a tool safely instead of assuming it does more than it claims.
FAQ
Can quantum-resistant cryptography stop phishing?
No. Phishing works by convincing you to hand over your own key or seed phrase voluntarily -- no cryptographic scheme can prevent a user from doing that.
Does post-quantum protection help if my device already has malware on it?
Not against malware that can already observe your screen or inputs directly -- that is a device-security problem, separate from which cryptography protects the key underneath.
Is there any wallet that protects against every possible future attack?
No. That would require certainty about attack methods that have not been invented yet, which no legitimate cryptography claims to offer.
So what does 'quantum-resistant' actually promise?
That the specific, known quantum attack method (Shor's algorithm) against today's most common wallet cryptography has no known equivalent shortcut against the post-quantum algorithm used instead -- a bounded, checkable claim, not an absolute one.